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On April 26, 2000, Vermont's governor signed legislation
recognizing civil unions between same-sex couples.1 Under the new
law, same-sex couples entering into civil unions will enjoy the same
benefits and obligations that Vermont law provides for different-sex
couples who enter into civil marriages. The law was a legislative
response to Baker v. State,2 a state supreme court decision
interpreting the state constitution as requiring the state to equalize
the benefits and obligations afforded same-sex couples and
different-sex married couples.3  The court's decision explicitly
contemplated the possibility that the legislature could remedy the
discrimination either by extending civil marriage to same-sex
couples, or by creating a new institution entailing the same state-
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1974 from St. Lawrence University. After graduation from Albany Law School, he served as
clerk for a bankruptcy judge in the Eastern District of New York. He joined Weil, Gotshal &
Manges LLP as an associate in October of 1981. Firm colleagues respected his character and
excellent work on large reorganization matters, such as the Tacoma Boat Building Company
Chapter 11 case and the financial restructuring of the Crompton and Elsinore Chapter 11
cases.
The Edward C. Sobota '79 Memorial Lecture Series was established in 1988 in memory of
Edward C. Sobota '79 by his brother Henry Sobota '77, the Sobota family, and by Weil,
Gotshal & Manges.
** Garver Professor of Jurisprudence, Yale Law School. This paper was presented on
October 12, 2000, at Albany Law School as the 2000 Edward C. Sobota '79 Memorial Lecture.
1 An Act Relating to Civil Unions, H.B. 847, 1999 Gen. Assem., Adjourned Sess. (Vt. 1999).
2 744 A.2d 864 (Vt. 1999); see also An Act Relating to Civil Unions, H.B. 847, 1999 Gen.
Assem., Adjourned Sess. (Vt. 1999) (stating that the "purpose of [the civil unions] act is to
respond to the constitutional violation found by the Vermont Supreme Court in Baker v.
Statd').
3 Baker, 744 A.2d at 867.
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sanctioned benefits (such as the right to bring a lawsuit for the
wrongful death of a spouse) or obligations (such as the duty of
support and maintenance) for same-sex couples that are afforded to
different-sex married couples. Six European countries had created
such new institutions, called registered partnerships.
Most of the criticism of Baker, and the ensuing civil union law,
came from traditionalists who assailed these moves as
compromising the institution of marriage, or promoting
homosexuality. Some of the criticism, however, came from liberals
who assailed these moves as falling short of full legal equality for
lesbian, gay, and bisexual people-in essence creating a "separate
but equal" regime for gays. In important respects, the civil union
law is inconsistent with the premises of the liberal state as applied
to same-sex couples: it treats them differently from different-sex
couples, and for reasons that are hard to justify without resort to
arguments grounded in status denigration or even prejudices.
Justice Denise Johnson dissented from Bakes reluctance to require
the state to issue marriage licenses to same-sex couples. The
majority's concern with "disruptive and unforeseen consequences,"
she argued, was the same kind of concern raised by segregationist
states opposing judicial remediation of apartheid in the 1950s and
1960s. "The Supreme Court's 'compelling answer' to that contention
was 'that constitutional rights may not be denied simply because of
hostility to their assertion or exercise."'
4
In the legislature, Representative Steve Hingtgen opposed any
compromise on the ground that it "validates the bigotry" against
lesbians, gay men, and bisexuals. 5  Representative Hingtgen
expressed his opposition, saying "[i]t does more than validate it. It
institutionalizes the bigotry and affirmatively creates an apartheid
system of family recognition in Vermont."6 Although I think the
analogy of civil unions and Baker to racial apartheid and Plessy v.
Ferguson is inapt, Justice Johnson and Representative Hingtgen
raise pertinent issues. The legislation is a compromise of liberal
principles-but a small and perhaps temporary one that both
contributes to liberal projects and reveals some limitations in the
liberal ideal for our polity.
4 Id. at 902 (Johnson, J., dissenting in part) (quoting Watson v. City of Memphis, 373 U.S.
526, 535 (1963)).
5 Transcript of Hearing Before the Vermont House Comm. on the Judiciary, Feb. 9, 2000,
at 4 [hereinafter Transcript of Hearing].
6 Id.
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I. CIVIL UNIONS AS A SACRIFICE OF LIBERAL PRINCIPLES
Liberal theories maintain that the state exists to provide a
context within which its members can flourish. The state properly
creates public goods (like roads), prevents people from hurting one
another or unnecessarily interfering in one another's affairs, and
(by some accounts) inculcates civic virtues of toleration and
cooperation in the citizenry.7 On the whole, the state is supposed to
be neutral as to its citizens' moral virtue." Thus, the liberal state is
not permitted to hurt people or treat them differently because they
are unpopular or even objectionable, so long as they are not
positively harming other people or depriving them of their
recognized liberties. 9 The liberal state can arrest and otherwise
penalize a person for coercing another person to have penile-vaginal
sex with him, but not for engaging in oral intercourse with a
consenting adult. The former harms another; the latter does not.
Liberal premises do not require the state to recognize any two
people's marriages, nor to attach legal obligations and benefits to
such interpersonal commitments, but once the state has made a
policy decision to recognize and even encourage marriages, the state
may not arbitrarily deny that recognition and bundle of regulations.
For example, the state presumptively cannot give marriage licenses
to same-race couples but deny them to different-race couples. The
United States Supreme Court elevated this liberal principle to a
constitutional rule in Loving v. Virginia, 10 which held that the state
could not bar different-race marriages. The primary ground for the
Court's holding was that the law prohibiting different-race
marriages was an invidious discrimination on the basis of race,
which is a highly suspect classification. Under the Court's liberal
reading of the equal protection clause, the state cannot deny
See, e.g., BRUCE ACKERMAN, SOCIAL JUSTICE IN THE LIBERAL STATE 349-78 (1980); JOHN
RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 31 (1971).
8 See JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM 4 (1993).
9 See, e.g., JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY, ch. 4 (Currin V. Shields ed., Liberal Arts Press
1956) (1859); RICHARD A. POSNER, SEX AND REASON 3-4, 202-03, 215, 230-31, 233-34, 259,
288, 379-80, 438 (1992) (applying this Millian insight to sexual minorities, such as gays).
10 388 U.S. 1, 2 (1967) (invalidating a state bar to different-race marriages as both an
unconstitutional discriminatory act and unjustified deprivation of a fundamental liberty).
The state had made a liberal argument justifying its discrimination: different-race marriages
would produce public harms, namely, a 'mongrel breed of citizens."' Id. at 7. This argument
was factually unfounded and was, as the Court held, simply a rationalization for the state's
goal of promoting "White Supremacy." Id. at 11-12. Such a goal is invalid under liberal
premises.
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marriage licenses to a black-white couple because of the race of one
partner.
Today, the Court's liberal jurisprudence considers sex a quasi-
suspect classification, namely, one that is presumptively arbitrary
and requires strong justification when deployed by state policy. To
the irritation of many, but refutation by none, Andrew Koppelman
has argued that, by analogy to miscegenation, state recognition of
same-sex marriage is required by this liberal sex discrimination
jurisprudence: just as it is race discrimination for the state to deny
marriage licenses to black-white couples because of the race of one
partner, so it is sex discrimination for the state to deny marriage
licenses to female-female couples because of the sex of one partner.11
Koppelman's argument takes the liberal case for same-sex marriage
and shows how it is mandated by the Court's constitutional
jurisprudence.
12
An alternative holding of Loving was even broader: the Court
said that the state presumptively could not deny couples the
"fundamental" right to marry without strong justification. 13 The
Court has elaborated on this principle by holding, in a later case,
that the state cannot presumptively deny convicted felons the
ability to marry, even during their confinement in prison.14 The
Court reasoned that the extensive bundle of individual and
partnership rights and benefits entailed in marriage were just as
important for felons as for civilians.' 5  This is a demanding
liberalism and one wonders how far it reaches. The Court's answer
is that state restriction on the "freedom of personal choice in
matters of marriage and family life" can only be acceptable if it is
"supported by sufficiently important state interests and is closely
tailored to effectuate only those interests.' 6 Some restrictions can
11 See generally Andrew Koppelman, Why Discrimination Against Lesbians and Gay Men
is Sex Discrimination, 69 N.Y.U. L. REV. 197 (1994). The main argument against
Koppelman's thesis-that the class of people hurt by miscegenation laws (blacks) matches up
with the classification (race) and the equal protection goal (anti-racism), while the class of
people hurt by different-sex marriage laws (gays) does not match up with the classification
(sex) or the equal protection goal (anti-sexism)-is answered in WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR.,
THE CASE FOR SAME-SEX MARRIAGE 162-72 (1996). See also id. at 172-82 (arguing that the
same-sex marriage bar is also irrational sexual orientation discrimination).
12 See Koppelman, supra note 11, at 208-19.
L Loving, 388 U.S. at 12.
14 See Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 95-99 (1987). Consistent with liberal theory, the
Court said that deprivation of the right to marry might be justified under some circumstances
as part of an appropriate punishment for felons who have harmed others. See id. at 97.
15 Id. at 95-96.
16 Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 385, 388 (1978) (striking down a law requiring dead-
beat dads to discharge their outstanding support obligations before they could remarry). The
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pass this test. For example, the state can deny marriage licenses to
minors, under the reasonable supposition that a minor does not
have the maturity of judgment to consent to the life-changing
commitment of marriage. Although not so easy a case, the state can
plausibly maintain that marriage licenses should not be given to
closely related persons, such as siblings or uncles and nieces,
because the possibility of marriage between close relatives risks
undermining the family as a safe haven where children can receive
emotional support without sexual attachment. 17 In both of these
cases, there is an important state interest that motivates the
restriction on civil marriage. (In both cases, by the way, churches
could recognize such marriages even if the state did not.)
Can the liberal state deny marriage licenses to polygamous
partners, typically one man and two women? This was once the
main argument against same-sex marriage recognition-it would
require the state to recognize polygamous ones as well. That is
hardly clear. John Stuart Mill believed liberalism to be hostile to
laws making polygamy a crime, but disapproved of state recognition
of polygamy, on the ground that it has third-party effects harmful to
women. 18 In our society, polygamy would make it easier for many
women to find husbands, but a modern Millian would doubt that
women who share their husbands with other women would find
happiness, because the bargaining position of the man within
marriage would be so much greater. In fact, this liberal argument
against polygamy is one of the best arguments for same-sex
marriage. If women had other options, other than marrying men,
their bargaining power within male-female marriage would be
greater, and wives might actually start getting the equal treatment
our society has long claimed that they have.
The state that cannot legitimately deny different-race couples, or
even convicted felons, marriage licenses ought not to deny two adult
Court in Zablochi discussed the family and procreative features of traditional marriage, but
did not tie marriage to procreation. See generally id.; see also ESKRIDGE, supra note 11, at
128-29 (discussing Zablochi and Thrner, both of which failed to even discuss procreation as
issues involved in state-recognized marriages).
17 The old rationale that incestuous marriages would pose high genetic risks is criticized in
Carolyn S. Bratt, Incest Statutes and the Fundamental Right of Marriage." Is Oedipus Free to
Marry, 18 FAM. L.Q. 257, 267-81 (1984).
18 See MILL, supra note 9, at 112-13. For current debate, compare CAROL ROSE, PROPERTY
AND PERSUASION 240-41 (1994), arguing that polygamy would be good for women; and
ROBERT WRIGHT, THE MORAL ANIMAL: EVOLUTIONARY PSYCHOLOGY AND EVERYDAY LIFE 93-
107 (1996), arguing that "most men are probably better off in a monogamous system and most
women worse off;" with WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., GAYLAW: CHALLENGING THE APARTHEID
OF THE CLOSET 290-92 (1999).
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women the same basic right, and the associated state rights and
benefits. 19 Liberal philosophy would reject outright the notion that
the state can deny two women the right to marry simply because
third parties consider lesbian relationships morally objectionable or
desire to disrespect such relationships. These are not good liberal
reasons for denying some people state benefits and obligations owed
to other people. For this and other reasons, opponents of same-sex
marriage in Vermont and elsewhere have de-emphasized these
kinds of arguments and instead have maintained that state
recognition of same-sex marriages would have harmful third-party
effects.
The main third-party effect invoked by states defending their
marriage bars in Vermont and Hawaii was the claim that children
would suffer. The argument usually goes something like this:
same-sex marriage would create more households where lesbian
and gay parents are raising children; children are much better off
being raised in households where the parents are heterosexual;
therefore, same-sex marriage would be bad for a number of
children. 0 The Vermont and Hawaii courts rejected this argument
as factually unsupported.2 1  Social scientists who have studied
mom-and-mom households with children have found no material
differences in the well-being of the children, compared with those
19 For more detailed liberal philosophical and legal arguments for same-sex marriage, see
generally ESKRIDGE, supra note 11; MORRIS B. KAPLAN, SEXUAL JUSTICE: DEMOCRATIC
CITIZENSHIP AND THE POLITICS OF DESIRE (1997); RICHARD D. MOHR, A MORE PERFECT
UNION: WHY STRAIGHT AMERICA MUST STAND UP FOR GAY RIGHTS (1994); DAVID A.J.
RICHARDS, SEX, DRUGS, DEATH, AND THE LAW: AN ESSAY ON HUMAN RIGHTS AND
OVERCRIMINALIZATION 29-83 (1982); Mary Becker, Women, Morality, and Sexual Orientation,
8 UCLA WOMEN'S L.J. 165 (1998); Mary Coombs, Sexual Dis-Orientation." Transgendered
People and Same-Sex Marriage, 8 UCLA WOMEN'S L.J. 219 (1998); Mary C. Dunlap, The
Lesbian and Gay Marriage Debate.- A Microcosm of Our Hopes and ]'oubles in the Nineties, 1
LAw & SEXUALITY 62 (1991); Nan D. Hunter, Marriage, Law, and Gender: A Feminist
Inquiry, 1 LAW & SEXUALITY 9 (1991); Koppelman, supra note 11; Evan Wolfson, Crossing the
Threshold- Equal Marriage Rights for Lesbians and Gay Men and the Intra-Community
Critique, 21 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 567 (1994-95).
20 Factual underpinnings for this argument are developed in Lynn D. Wardle, The
Potential Impact of Homosexual Parenting on Children, 1997 U. ILL. L. REV. 833 (1997)
(criticizing studies finding no impact of lesbian parents on children, and invoking social
scientists who assert bad influences). But see infra note 22.
21 See Baker v. State, 744 A.2d 864, 884-85 (Vt. 1999); Baehr v. Miike, 1996 WL 694235,
18, 27, 28, 30, 31, 38, 52, 55, 91, 123 (Haw. Cir. Ct. 1996), af'fd, 950 P.2d 1234 (Hawaii 1997)
(refuting the state's argument that it had an interest in protecting children by prohibiting
same-sex marriages because, as their witnesses testified, children receive an "overabundance
of information about one gender and little information about the other gender"), revWd and
remanded, 994 P.2d 566 (Haw. 1999).
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reared in straight mom-and-dad households. 22 Because most of the
studies have involved small samples, and none have been able to
sample randomly, these conclusions remain provisional. But the
consensus of the studies certainly forebodes against claims that
same-sex marriage will have third-party effects on children.
Vermont's civil unions law recognizes that the liberal state cannot
discriminate against same-sex couples, and that including them
within the state's family law regime is consistent with the purposes
of those legal benefits and duties. 23 Consistent with Baker, the law
posits as its central goal "to provide eligible same-sex couples the
opportunity 'to obtain the same benefits and protections afforded by
Vermont law to married opposite-sex couples."' 24 And the law itself
specifically assures same-sex couples the same statutory benefits
and obligations as different-sex couples and meticulously integrates
civil unions into Vermont's family law. The most thoughtful
officials in Vermont-from Representative Tom Little who chaired
the House Committee that drafted the bill, to Representative
Hingtgen who ultimately voted for it notwithstanding his earlier
reservations, to Governor Howard Dean, who risked his political
career by signing the bill into law-believed that this law satisfies
the obligations of liberalism. Yet, it is clear that the law does not
assure the full equality liberalism would seem to demand.
A. Unequal Status
To begin with, the civil unions law forthrightly concedes that it
"does not bestow the status of civil marriage"25 on same-sex couples,
even though the legislature clearly had the authority to do that; the
law justifies its choice as one that "will provide due respect for
tradition and long-standing social institutions."26 On the face of it,
this is a compromise of liberal principles. The legislature
acknowledges that marriage is a matter of status, as well as rights
and duties. Socially, the married couple has long had a special, and
generally privileged, status in American society. That privileged
status remains reserved for different-sex-presumptively
22 See Carlos A. Ball & Janice Farrell Pea, Warring with Wardle: Morality, Social Science,
and Gay and Lesbian Parents, 1998 U. ILL. L. REV. 253 (1998) (surveying social science
evidence extensively and refuting the claims made in Wardle, supra note 20).
23 See An Act Relating to Civil Unions, H.B. 847, 1999 Gen. Assem., Adjourned Sess., §§
1(3)-(9) (Vt. 1999) (enumerating legislative findings, and emphasizing the state's interest in
protecting families).
24 Id. at § 2(a).
25 Id. at § 1(10).
26 Id.
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heterosexual-couples; same-sex couples, who are acknowledged to
form similar commitments and families, get another institution
which is presented as marriage without the name. The historically
excluded group can easily view this as second-class citizenship, the
only justification for which is "tradition"-the belief that marriage
has long been limited to unions between men and women.
27
Tradition is generally not a liberal justification for a polity's
treating some citizens differently from others-if it were, liberalism
would lose most of its analytical bite.
There is a disturbing parallel between the civil unions law and
the segregation of railroad cars upheld by the United States
Supreme Court in Plessy v. Ferguson.28  Just as Louisiana gave
blacks and whites separate and (assertedly) equal railroad cars,29 so
Vermont gives gays and straights separate and (assertedly) equal
legal forms for their committed relationships. In each case, the
separate forms were defended on grounds of formal equality: blacks
got a railroad coach, just not the same one whites enjoyed; gays get
state recognition for their committed relationships, just not the
same one straights enjoy. In each case, the minority objected that
separation, viewed in its social context, symbolically reflected and
deepened a functional inequality-whose relevance the state denied.
Dissenting in Pessy, Justice Harlan argued that, "[e]very one
knows that the statute in question had its origin in the purpose...
to exclude colored people from coaches occupied by or assigned to
white persons."30 Analogously, the Vermont statutory reaffirmation
that "marriage... consists of a union between a man and a
woman"31 had its origin in the purpose to exclude homosexual
people from the institution of marriage occupied by, or assigned to,
straight persons. In each case, the state pandered to private
prejudices in creating a symbolic discrimination and invoked
tradition to justify it. Just as the U.S. Supreme Court deferred to
Louisiana's discretion "to act with reference to the established
usages, customs and traditions of the people,"32 so the Vermont
27 This assertion in the text is true as far as formal American law is concerned, but it is not
true historically or functionally. Many societies in human history have recognized same-sex
unions as marriages. For example, Native American societies within the United States have
done so, and same-sex couples have received marriage licenses in the United States by
various means. See ESKRIDGE, supra note 11, at ch. 2.
28 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
29 See id. at 551-52.
30 Ad. at 557 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
31 An Act Relating to Civil Unions, H.B. 847, 1999 Gen. Assem., Adjourned Sess., § i(i)
(Vt. 1999).
32 Pessy, 163 U.S. at 550.
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legislature exercised its discretion to give "due respect for tradition
and long-standing social institutions" to create a new institution
rather than admit lesbian and gay couples into marriage. 3 The
next part of this lecture will explore the analogy in greater depth,
but for now my point is that liberal concerns about Plessy parallel
those with same-sex unions: each regime acquiesces in tradition-
based distinctions that connote second-class citizenship for the
historically subordinated group.
B. Unequal Benefits and Obligations (Federal Law)
To the liberal it is highly disturbing that a Vermont couple
entering into a civil union is not equally situated with a married
couple in regard to benefits and obligations afforded by federal law.
Spousehood, or being married, entitles persons or couples to 1049
benefits and duties under federal statutes, ranging from
immigration law's allowance of citizenship to spouses of American
citizens, to a multitude of conflict of interest rules disabling federal
officials from making decisions affecting the interests of their
spouses as well as themselves.3 4 The Defense of Marriage Act of
1996 (DOMA) provides that, for purposes of federal statutes and
regulations, "the word 'marriage' means only a legal union between
one man and one woman as husband and wife, and the word
'spouse' refers only to a person of the opposite sex who is a husband
or a wife." 35 Although DOMA does not explicitly say whether a
same-sex civil union can be treated as a "marriage" for purposes of
federal law, or whether civil union partners can be "spouses," it can
easily be read to preclude federal agencies and courts from treating
civil unions like marriages.
If DOMA were read this way, the inconsistency between state
treatment of same-sex unions and different-sex marriages becomes
much greater: not only do lesbian and gay couples suffer the
symbolic disrespect associated with separate-but-equal regimes, but
they do not even get an institution that is close to equal in terms of
benefits and duties. The situation of gay people would flunk even
the Plessy "separate but equal" test, which required at least formal
equality. That civil unions are separate but ridiculously unequal in
33 An Act Relating to Civil Unions, H.B. 847, 1999 Gen. Assem., Adjourned Sess., § 1(10)
(Vt. 1999).
34 See generally GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, REPORT TO THE HONORABLE HENRY J.
HYDE, CHAIRMAN, COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES: THE
DEFENSE OF MARRIAGE ACT, GAO/OCG 97-16 (1996).
35 Pub. L. No. 104-199, § 3(a), 110 Stat. 2419 (codified at 1 U.S.C. § 7 (1996)).
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this way is no fault of Vermont's, of course, for no state can alter the
rules dictated by the 1996 federal law. Indeed, DOMA would more
clearly deny benefits and obligations if Vermont had adopted same-
sex marriage. The liberal's complaint is therefore with the federal
government, whose law treats citizens very differently without any
neutral justification.
3 6
C. Unequal Benefits and Duties (State Level)
Another way in which civil unions will constitute a separate-but-
unequal regime for same-sex couples is their relative lack of
portability. As of October 2000, thirty-four states have adopted
junior-DOMAs, that is, statutes providing that their courts should
not recognize same-sex marriages validly entered into in another
jurisdiction or state.37 The Mississippi law, for example, says that
"[a]ny marriage between persons of the same gender that is valid in
another jurisdiction does not constitute a legal or valid marriage in
Mississippi."3 8  Subject to constitutional challenges, these laws
would in almost all cases prevent same-sex couples married in
Vermont from taking advantage of the legal benefits of marriage.
Junior-DOMA states would surely not treat civil unions any more
liberally: absent constitutional problems, the courts in such states
would accord no benefits to civil union partners, either because
state marriage benefit law does not include civil unions, or because
the junior-DOMA precludes recognition of any kind of same-sex
union.
In at least some states that have not adopted junior DOMAs, or
whose statutes are loosely drafted or found to be unconstitutional, a
Vermont same-sex marriage would probably be recognized. Most
states have statutes or judicial precedents requiring recognition of
out-of-state marriages if they were valid in the states where they
were entered, unless such marriages would be contrary to a
fundamental public policy of the recognizing state.39 If Vermont
36 For arguments that DOMA is unconstitutional, see, for example, Andrew Koppelman,
Dumb and DOMA: Why the Defense of Marriage Act is Unconstitutional, 83 IOWA L. REV. 1
(1997); Evan Wolfson & Michael F. Melcher, Constitutional and Legal Detects in the 'Defense
of Marriage"Act, 16 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 221, 231-39 (1996).
37 Most of the laws are collected and analyzed in Andrew Koppelman, Same-Sex Marriage
and Public Policy.- The Miscegenation Precedents, 16 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 105, 134-50 (1996).
38 MISS. CODE ANN. § 93-1-1(2) (1997).
39 Choice-of-law precepts for interstate recognition of same-sex marriages are laid down by
Barbara J. Cox in Same-Sex Marriage and Choice of Law: If We Marry in Hawaii, Are We
Still Married When We Return Home, 1994 WIS. L. REV. 1033, 1062-1118 (1994), and by
[Vol. 64
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had amended its marriage law to include same-sex couples, it is
likely that a few states would have recognized those marriages
when couples engaged in transactions or even relocated to their
jurisdictions. Some of the states, but probably not all of them, that
would have been willing to recognize Vermont same-sex marriages
would not be willing to recognize Vermont same-sex civil unions.
For example, assume a Vermont same-sex couple that relocates to
Massachusetts. One partner is killed by a negligent motorist. If the
couple were married in Vermont, there is a good chance that
Massachusetts would allow the survivor to sue for her own anguish,
and as the presumptive representative of the decedent's estate. The
odds go down-no one knows how much-if the couple is just civil
unioned, rather than married, in Vermont. Although the extent of
the problem is indeterminate, Vermont's decision to recognize same-
sex unions but not marriages may affect the portability rights of
same-sex couples.
II. SUBSTANTIAL EQUALITY AND THE INAPTNESS OF THE APARTHEID
TAG: CIVIL UNIONS AS A BIG STEP FORWARD IN THE POLITICS OF
RECOGNITION
I am a classical liberal and a gay person who supports legal
recognition of same-sex marriages. My last book criticized the
twentieth century legal regime that created an "apartheid of the
closet" for lesbian, bisexual, gay, and transgendered people. 40 Yet I
do not think the civil unions law creates an apartheid, as
Representative Hingtgen charged. Nor do I believe the analogy to
Plessy holds up: formally, the law is neither separate nor equal;
functionally, the law ameliorates, rather than ratifies, a sexuality
caste system. The racial apartheid adopted by southern state
legislatures and upheld in Plessy was very different from the new
institution suggested in Baker and adopted by the Vermont
legislature. The analogical relationship of apartheid and civil
unions is complicated, however, and does not establish that the civil
unions law creates a liberal regime.
Linda J. Silberman, Can the Island of Hawaii Bind the World? A Comment on Same-Sex
Marriage and Federalism Values, 16 QUINNIPiAC L. REV. 191, 192-203 (1996).
40 ESKRIDGE, supra note 18.
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A. The Inapt Analogy to Apartheid
I start with the socio-legal background of apartheid. During
Reconstruction (1866-1877), the southern states were readmitted to
the union upon the condition that they would assure black people
(the former slaves) free and equal citizenship as required by the
Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments. Hence, the constitutions
and laws of those states did not initially require segregation of the
races, a practice that some of the Reconstructors considered
antithetical to the equality principle of the Fourteenth
Amendment.4 1  After Reconstruction ended, southern states
backslid, adopting laws and amending their constitutions to create
the legal foundations for apartheid. Segregation of the sort upheld
in Plessy was at least a compromise of the equality baseline set
during Reconstruction and, as practiced, a betrayal of the goals of
Reconstruction. In short, apartheid was a major setback in the
politics of recognition for African-Americans and their allies.
Contrast the socio-legal background of same-sex unions. For most
of the twentieth century, lesbian and gay people were outlaws,
potential felons on the basis of their consensual activities and social
outcasts if their identities were revealed. Even after gay rights
activists initiated a serious politics of recognition following
Stonewall (1969),42 the focus of legal reform remained fixed on the
repeal of sex crime laws and the enactment of anti-discrimination
laws, not on state recognition of same-sex relationships. Gay rights
leaders all but abandoned same-sex marriage as an issue in the
1980s, even before the Supreme Court announced a gay-hostile
constitutional baseline. In Bowers v. Hardwic, 43 the Court ruled
that the state could make "homosexual sodomy" between consenting
adults a criminal felony.44 Hardwick is the gay parallel to Plessy, or
even to Scott v. Sanford,45 where the Supreme Court held that
African Americans could not be U.S. citizens.46 Just as Plessy
accepted an apartheid, where people of color were physically
41 See Michael W. McConnell, Originalism and the Desegregation Decisions, 81 VA. L. REV.
947, 947-1049 (1995) for an excellent collection of the historical evidence recounted in text-
and a controversial thesis that segregation was contrary to the original expectations of the
Fourteenth Amendment ratifiers.
42 See Cox, supra note 39, at 1033-34 (acknowledging the universal recognition of the riots
at Stonewall on June 27, 1969, as "the ignition point for the modern lesbian and gay civil
rights movement").
43 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
44 See id. at 188-89, 196.
45 60 U.S. 393 (1857).
46 Id. at 404-05.
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separated from white people, so Hardwick accepted an apartheid of
the closet, where gay people were psychically separated from
straight people.
Socially, politically, and even constitutionally, Baker bears a
closer kinship to Brown v. Board of Education.4 7 Baker is like
Brown just as Hardwick is like Plessy. Like Brown, and unlike
Plessy, Baker reflected an advancement of gay people's politics of
recognition, from the outlaw status reflected in Hardwick, to the
status of substantially equal citizens before the law. Like Brown ,
which insisted on functional, as well as formal, equality for blacks,
Baker required functional as well as formal equality for gays. But,
like Brown 1, which allowed the political system the opportunity to
create a regime of equal benefits for black schoolchildren, Baker
gave the political system the opportunity to create a regime of equal
rights for same-sex couples. The Vermont legislative response, the
civil unions law, came much more rapidly than the response of
southern states and school districts in the wake of Brown.
B. Substantial Equality of Civil Unions and Marriage for Serving
the Purposes of Committed Couples
Plessy ratified a regime that took away rights from people of color
that many of them wanted to have, such as the right to ride in the
railroad car of their choice. A later case, Cumming v. Richmond
County Board of Education,48 extended Plessy to public education,
and denied black families choice as to schooling as well.49 Although
these cases announced a constitutional rule of separate but equal,
there is no doubt that separate rarely meant anything close to
equal, especially in the context of public schools: the schools for
black children were greatly under-funded, and in practice there was
gross inequality in the education provided the different classes of
citizens.
Contrast Baker, which insisted that same-sex couples wanting
state recognition be given the same benefits and rights as different-
sex couples who want state recognition. Following Baker, the civil
unions law gives civil-unioned partners a variety of state-supported
47 347 U.S. 483, 492-96 (1954) (Brown I) (concluding "that in the field of public education
the doctrine of 'separate but equal' has no place"); 349 U.S. 294, 294-301 (1955) (Brown II)
(requiring that the parties to the action be admitted to the schools at issue "with all
deliberate speed").
48 175 U.S. 528 (1899).
49 See id. at 542-45.
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rights and benefits that they did not have before the law was
adopted, including the rights to:
1. receive maintenance and support from their partners;50
2. access to state courts and rules for division of property51
and child custody upon divorce,5 2 as well as for remediation
of spousal abuse; 53
3. priority of inheritance if their partners die without wills,
as well as legal capacity to hold property as tenants in the
entirety;54
4. bring lawsuits for wrongful death of partners, and seek
damages for loss of consortium and emotional distress;55
5. visitation and notification when their partners are
hospitalized;56
6. make or revoke anatomical gifts by partners; 57
7. the joint care and parenthood of children born to one of the
partners during the union;58
8. adopt children jointly with their partners, or adopt the
children their partners bring to the union; 9
9. be free of discrimination on the basis of being married;60
10. victim's and workers' compensation benefits as a family
unit;61
11. family leave and public assistance benefits under state
law;6
2
12. immunity from testifying against their partners, if they
choose to invoke it;63
13. equal treatment as married couples under state and local
tax laws;
64
50 VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1204(d) (1991).
l Id. § 1204(d).
562 Id
63 Id. § 1204(e)(6).
64 Id. § 1204(e)(1), (3).
s5 Id. § 1204(e)(2).
56 Id. § 1204(e)(10).
57 Id. § 1204(e)(19).
58 Id. § 1204(0.
69 Id. § 1204(e)(4).
60 Id. § 1204(e)(7).
61 Id. § 1204(e)(8)-(9).
62 Id. § 1204(e)(12)-(13).
63 Id. § 1240(e)(15).
64 Id. §§ 1204(e)(14), 1204(e)(16).
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and so forth. This is a long list of rights and benefits, and I could
have made it longer. Moreover, these rights and benefits of civil
unions narrow, and for some couples will eliminate, the gap
between rights accorded married different-sex couples and those of
unioned same-sex couples.
Family law scholar David Chambers has organized the cluster of
state-sanctioned benefits and rights of being married in a helpful
way.65 Some state regulations, such as the first six in my list above,
require private parties to respect or be accountable to the emotional
unity of the married or unioned couple. These emotional unity
rules 66 create a presumption that each partner acts for the well-
being of the other partner. Such rules can sometimes be achieved
through wills, powers of attorney, and negotiations with third
parties, but special state laws make it easier for married or unioned
partners to take it for granted that hospitals, blood relatives,
employers, and even one another will treat each as the family of the
other. Other regulations, such as the next two in my list, relate to
parental rights,67 or the ability of both partners to adopt children
and to be considered parents of children born to either of them
during the course of their marriage or civil union. The parental
rights regulations, which vary widely among the states, would
usually be more useful for lesbian and gay couples than straight
couples, because the former can have children together only by
adoption or by a legal presumption for children born within the
relationship. The last five items on the list above, as well as the
first item, are regulations whereby the state will treat the married
or unioned partners as an economic uni68 for purposes of their own
internal accounting, their commercial dealings with third parties,
and their obligations (taxes) to the state.
However one categorizes the array of rights and benefits that
accrue to both married and unioned couples in Vermont, their
overall purpose is a classic liberal one, "a facilitating function-
offering couples opportunities to shape satisfying lives as formal
equals and as they, rather than the state, see fit. '' 69 Within the
65 David L. Chambers, Mhat 1. The Legal Consequences o/Marriage and the Legal Needs
olLesbian and Gay Male Couples, 95 MICH. L. REV. 447, 454-85 (1996). Chambers' article
does not focus on Vermont, but the large majority of his generalizations would apply just as
well to that state as to others. My textual discussion changes his categorizations in ways that
I find productive, but that he may not.
66 See id. at 454-61 (describing regulations that recognize emotional attachments, which
"can best be seen as facilitators of the affective aspects of couples' relationships").
67 See id. at 461-70.
68 See id. at 470-85.
69 Id. at 454.
2001]
HeinOnline  -- 64 Alb. L. Rev. 867 2000-2001
Albany Law Review
confines of Vermont law, the civil unions statute has not only
conferred rights and benefits that are the same as those conferred
by state law on married couples, but those rights and benefits
subserve the classical goal of liberalism, facilitating people's
abilities to structure their committed relationships. This full formal
equality within Vermont contrasts with formal inequalities
introduced by federal law and by the laws of other states if they do
not recognize civil unions, and with functional inequalities created
by social hostility to same-sex unions.
C. Civil Unions and Liberal Values
A final difference between the separate-but-grossly-unequal
regime of apartheid and the separate-but-substantially-equal
regime of civil unions is that the latter seeks to, and probably will,
advance liberal values. Segregation of the races in railroad cars and
public schools was part of the larger social program of apartheid.
The massive separation of the races in all avenues of public life-
drinking fountains, swimming pools, colleges, restaurants,
restrooms, hotels, workplaces-had the intended effect of
inculcating what we today would consider racist values. Most of the
people who grew up under apartheid harbored irrational beliefs
(e.g., that human beings of African ancestry were materially
different from human beings of European ancestry) and accepted
the social as well as political subordination of minority races as
natural. The acceptance of irrational stereotypes and social
subordination both reflected and generated deep and complex racial
prejudices.70 The dismantling of legal apartheid has not ended
racial prejudice, stereotypes, or social subordination, but social
science surveys suggest that this move has helped ameliorate all
three. Surveys of white people over the latter half of the twentieth
century-the period when de jure segregation ended and de facto
segregation eroded-demonstrate that the popularity of negative
stereotypes about people of color has plummeted and that their
material status has improved (both absolutely and vis-d-vis whites)
and suggest that whites have more positive feelings and less
inclination to discriminate against blacks than they did before
70 Social scientists separate the emotive component, prejudice, from the cognitive
component, stereotyping, of category-based reactions. See, e.g., Susan T. Fiske, Stereotyping,
Prejudice, and Discrimination, in 2 HANDBOOK OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY, ch. 25 (Daniel T.
Gilbert et al. eds., 4th ed. 1998).
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Brown.71 While these surveys need to be read critically,72 even the
critics believe that progress has been made and that white people
harbor diminished prejudice-based attitudes, believe fewer
stereotypes, and discriminate against people of color less
deliberately in 2000 than they did in 1950.
73
With a few exceptions, most scholars praise Brown not only for
moving the law in a liberal direction, but also for contributing to a
socio-legal regime where liberal values of rationality, mutual
respect, and tolerance among black and white people could
flourish.7 4 One way that Brown contributed to liberal values was by
facilitating, and later being read to require, racial integration.
Social psychologists have formed a consensus that the best strategy
for ameliorating prejudice is cooperation between in-group and out-
group members, working on an equal status basis in pursuit of
common goals. 75 If the state itself refuses to discriminate, its
tolerant policy will create many opportunities for this kind of
cooperation among soldiers, teachers and students, researchers, and
ordinary bureaucrats working together and with private actors to
accomplish routine state goals. If the state can also reduce
71 See, e.g., John F. Dovidio & Samuel L. Gaertner, Prejudice, Discrimination, and Racism.-
Historical Trends and Contemporary Approaches, in PREJUDICE, DISCRIMINATION, AND
RACISM 1, 4-12 (John F. Dovidio & Samuel L. Gaertner, eds. 1986). The data does not help us
much in understanding how much of this progress was due to state anti-discrimination
policies and how much to other social trends.
72 See, e.g., John B. McConahay et al., Has Racism Declined in America?, 25 J. CONFLICT
RES. 563, 578-79 (1981) (concluding that white respondents often answer questionnaires to
appear more egalitarian than they actually are); see also Dovidio & Gaertner, supra note 71,
at 8 (acknowledging that "these figures may overestimate the degree to which white America
has truly reversed its disaffection for blacks and other minorities" and "may be more
superficial than real").
73 See ROY L. BROOKS, RETHINKING THE AMERICAN RACE PROBLEM 37 (1990) (stating that,
notwithstanding decades of progress, the median black family income is only fifty-seven
percent of that for a similar white family); David A. Strauss, The Law and Economics of
Racial Discrimination in Employment: The Case for Numerical Standards, 79 GEO. L.J.
1619, 1619, 1656-57 (1991) (advocating a new Title VII paradigm based on the fact that
attitudes prevalent in the 1960s have changed substantially).
74 The socio-political impact of Brown in either the short- or long-term remains
controversial. Compare Gerald Rosenberg, The Hollow Hope.- Can Courts Bring About Social
Change? (1991) (reporting doubt about any impact), with Michael J. Klarman, Rethinking the
Civil Rights and Civil Liberties Revolutions, 82 VA. L. REV. 1, 1-31 (arguing that there was a
significant impact).
75 GORDON W. ALLPORT, THE NATURE OF PREJUDICE 250-67 (1958). For empirical testing
substantially confirming Allport's insight, see, for example, Yehuda Amir, The Role oflInter-
Group Contact in Change of Prejudice and Ethnic Relations, in TOWARDS THE ELIMINATION OF
RACISM 245-94 (Phyllis A. Katz ed., 1976); Gregory M. Herek & John P. Capitanio, "Some of
My Best Friends.'" Intergroup Contact, Concealable Stigma, and Heterosexuals'Attitudes
Toward Gay Men and Lesbians," 23 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 412 (1995);
Norman Miller et al., Cooperative Interaction in Desegregated Settings.- A Laboratory
Analogue, 41 J. SOC. ISSUES 63, 63-79 (1985).
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discrimination by private employers and public accommodations
through anti-discrimination laws and the like, it can have an even
bigger impact. Not only does inter-group cooperation contribute to
better understanding about out-group members, but it more
importantly fosters feelings of empathy for out-group members.
The former reduces stereotyping, the latter ameliorates prejudice.
In this respect, too, Baker is much more like Brown than like
Plessy. With the addition of the civil unions law, Vermont's
regulatory regime is one where liberal values of rationality, mutual
respect, and tolerance among gay and straight people can flourish.
At the dawn of the millennium, Vermont not only conducts its
public business without discrimination on the basis of sexual
orientation, but requires private employers, public accommodations,
and schools to do the same. Like other states, Vermont takes a
strong legal stand against hate crimes, enhancing the penalties for
offenses motivated by race-, sex-, or sexuality-based prejudice. 76 It
is the only state to have adopted statutes explicitly allowing same-
sex partners to adopt one another's children and recognizing same-
sex unions. Not surprisingly, Vermont has one of the lowest levels
of anti-gay violence and discrimination in the United States.
Theories of prejudice suggest how Vermont's newest move, same-
sex unions, will contribute to the rational and tolerant society of
that state in a way that anti-discrimination laws do not. Anti-gay
prejudice is among the deepest in American society, and stereotypes
about gay people among the most outlandish. There is some social
science support for the proposition that prejudice is most intense
when in-group people view the out-group as challenging the in-
group's cherished norms and values.77
III. THE TENSION BETWEEN RIGHTS AND REMEDIES: EQUALITY
PRACTICE
Given the substantial equality assured by the civil unions law
and its positive contribution to a minority group's politics of
recognition, analogies to Plessy and racial apartheid are inapt if not
ridiculous. A more apt critique would start instead with Loving,
which invalidated laws barring different-race marriages. Assume
76 VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 1455. Similar state laws including antigay prejudice in their
penalty enhancements are collected in William N. Eskridge, Jr., Comparative Law and the
Same-Sex Marriage Debate- A Step-by-Step Approach Toward State Recognition, 31 MCGEO.
L. REV. 641, 661-72, app. II (2000).
77 See generally T.F. Pettigrew & R.W. Meertens, Subtle and Blatant Prejudice in Western
Europe, 25 EUR. J. SOC. PSYCHOL. 57 (1992).
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that Virginia had responded to Loving by passing a law creating a
new institution of civil unions just for different-race couples, and
that Virginia justified the new law on grounds of "due respect for
tradition and long-standing social institutions," which in Virginia
had never recognized different-race couples as civilly married.
Would that new law have satisfied the liberal standard of equality?
It would have been more defensible than the previous one, which
had imposed criminal sanctions on offending couples such as the
Lovings and had been bottomed on the goal of preserving the purity
of the white race and of "White Supremacy" generally. But would
substantial equality-the same benefits and duties but a different
name and possibly less portability-have been acceptable?
Reasonable minds might disagree, but I think my hypothetical
legislative response would have been and should have been
unacceptable in 1967. The uneasy parallel between my hypothetical
legislative response to Loving and the actual response to Baker
suggests that the liberal should, ultimately, be disappointed with
the civil unions law.
But should the liberal have voted against the civil unions law?
The answer to that, it seems to me, is no. The liberal should have
supported the law and the liberal's disappointment should be mixed
with satisfaction and a sense of achievement. If the civil unions law
is not equality, it is at least equality practice. Full equality ought to
be the goal for a liberal polity, but a polity which is a democracy and
whose citizens have heterogeneous views about important matters
is one where immediate full equality is not always possible, not
practical, not even desirable. In this final part, I want to point out a
problem inherent in liberal democracy, namely, the tension between
liberal rights and pragmatic remedies. There are a number of ways
to handle this tension. Although most liberal theorists are not
aware of it, or ignore it, I urge liberals to consider this lesson of
lesbian and gay experience: the process by which equal rights and
respect are achieved is one that is incremental and dialogic. The
idea of equality practice, suggested by lesbian and gay coming-out
stories, suggests a pragmatics that ought to be incorporated in real-
world liberalism.
A. Strategic Compromise o/Liberal Principles in a Heterogeneous
Democracy
Representative Tom Little, the chief architect of the civil unions
law, defended the compromise to his committee: "Leadership
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untempered by a practical assessment of the world we live in is not
sound leadership. What is achievable in this general assembly and
this body politic, is a broad civil rights bill and, speaking for myself,
that does not cross the threshold of marriage."78  His stance was
both humane and politically shrewd. Among the choices confronting
Representative Little's committee were the following:
A. amend the marriage law to include same-sex couples
B. create a parallel institution for same-sex couples, with all
or many of the same rights and benefits of marriage
C. do nothing, or as little as possible.
In my view, a majority of the committee, after listening to the
testimony, was at least theoretically open to option A. Yet, in
February 2000, the committee voted 8-3 to pursue option B, and
reported a bill embodying option B by a 10-1 vote in March. In the
short term, this was not only rational from their point of view, but
rational from the perspective of a liberal gay person, such as
Representative Lippert (the vice-chair of the committee), who
favored same-sex marriage.
I assume that Representative Little's own preferences were fully
liberal and that he personally favored option A. Voting without
consideration of views outside his committee, he would have
proposed option A. But, in politics, as in life, people vote
strategically-that is, they take account of other people's reactions
and vote for the option that when others have acted will best accord
with their preferences. 79 In February, Representative Little knew
that most Vermonters favored option C, that a large majority of his
House favored either option C or option B, and that Governor
Howard Dean favored option B and might have vetoed option A. In
the short term, if the committee chair had mobilized a bare majority
of the committee to report a same-sex marriage bill-as
Representative Little could probably have done-Vermont would
have ended up with option C: an option A bill would have been
defeated. Every member of the committee was strongly opposed to
option C, yet that is what they would have ended up with if the
committee had pursued its preferred option. The best is sometimes
the enemy of the good.
78 See Transcript of Hearing, supra note 5.
79 Strategic behavior is explained in WILLIAM H. RIKER & PETER C. ORDESHOOK, AN
INTRODUCTION TO POSITIVE POLITICAL THEORY 1-7 (1973), and is applied to courts as well as
legislatures in, for example, Symposium: Positive Political heory and Public Law, 80 GEO.
L.J. 457 (1992).
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Representative Little could have pursued another strategy, of
course: he could have gotten the committee to report option A, but
with option B as a fallback. This strategy would have had the
advantage of revealing to his colleagues outside the committee how
strongly impressed the committee members were by the testimony
they heard. Some minds might have been changed, but even if the
chamber defeated the committee's proposal it could still have voted
for option B, the next best choice. This alternative strategy would
not have been a good one, however, and it might have been
disastrous. The House debates were anguished enough when only
option B was before its members; forcing the representatives to
confront option A would have required them to make a harder
choice-between full equality and the wrath of the electorate.
Faced with the worst array of choices, some House members might
have blamed the committee and fallen back on option C instead.
The abstract liberal flourishes on making hard choices, the liberal
in politics dies by them.
Giving the House option A, with a fallback option B, would not
have improved the odds of option A being adopted, would have
posed some risk of ending up with option C, and, most importantly,
would have assured that the next legislature would have been filled
with a lot more supporters of option C. The legislature's choice of
civil unions, option B, was controversial enough. Four of eight
Republican House members targeted for voting in favor of civil
unions were defeated in the September twelfth Republican primary;
Representative Little himself won only sixty percent of the vote
against a political unknown. One state senator was knocked off in
the primary for his support of same-sex unions. Democratic
Governor Dean found himself locked in an intense battle for
reelection against a Republican whose main issue was the
governor's support for "homosexual marriage." Little, Dean, and
others who supported the civil unions law had the credible response
that they supported a compromise, the least that the Vermont
Supreme Court would have found acceptable, and not quite the
same thing as "gay marriage."80 Legislative adoption of same-sex
marriage might have polarized the electorate and yielded a
traditionalist backlash even more than civil unions have done. In
80 This was ultimately a successful strategy. In the November 2000 election, Governor
Dean was reelected by wide margin against two opponents (one of whom supported the civil
unions law), Democrats won the other statewide offices and retained control of the Senate,
and the main Republican winner, Senator Jeffords, was a strong supporter of civil unions.
More conservative Republicans gained control of the state House, however.
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that event, not only would the next legislature and governor have
been able to repeal the civil unions law, but they might have had
enough votes to propose a constitutional amendment overriding
Baker. In this nightmare scenario, pushing for option A, the best
choice, would not only have resulted in option C, the worst choice,
but would have run the risk of hard-wiring option C into Vermont
constitutional law.
The nightmare scenario is also the reason the Vermont Supreme
Court pulled its punches in Baker. The justices on that court were
aware of the fate of earlier same-sex marriage rulings in other
states. In 1993, the Hawaii Supreme Court held that the state bar
to recognition of same-sex marriages was sex discrimination under
the state constitution, and a trial court on remand ruled that the
state had not justified the discrimination, leaving it
unconstitutional.8' An Alaska trial judge found his state's same-sex
marriage bar unconstitutional as well.8 2 In November 1998, voters
in both states overrode the court decisions by adopting amendments
to their state constitutions that encoded different-sex marriage as
the constitutional, as well as statutory, norm. More than two-thirds
of the voters in both liberal Democratic Hawaii and libertarian
Republican Alaska supported the overrides. Enforcing liberal
constitutional principles, judges in both states had required option
A-and the electoral backlash not only insisted on option C but took
option A off the judicial and legislative agendas for the foreseeable
future. Aware of this background, the Baker court hedged its
constitutional ruling, leaving the legislature free to choose option B,
which would stand a greater chance of political survival.
Dissenting from this compromise, Justice Johnson invoked the
liberal principle she found in the U.S. Supreme Court's anti-
apartheid case law, "'that constitutional rights may not be denied
simply because of hostility to their assertion or exercise."'
8 3  I
admire her principled opinion, but as a scholarly liberal, I must
concede that the desegregation cases carry a more ambiguous
message. The cases from the beginning displayed a sharp
disconnection between liberal rights and practical remedies. For
example, Chief Justice Warren's opinion in Brown I was a
81 Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44 (Haw. 1993), reh k granted in part, 875 P.2d 225 (Hawaii
1993), on remand to Baehr v. Miike, 1996 WL 694235 (Haw. Cir. Ct. 1996), aff'd, 950 P.2d
1234 (Hawaii 1997).
82 Brause v. Bureau of Vital Statistics, 1998 WL 88743 (Alaska Sup. Ct. Feb. 1998).
83 Baker v. State, 744 A.2d 864, 902 (Vt. 1999) (quoting Watson v. City of Memphis, 373
U.S. 526, 535 (1963)).
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potentially far-reaching statement of liberal principle: the public
school system cannot discriminate on the basis of race. But this
was immediately followed by Brown 1, which required political
process free to remedy the constitutional violation, but "with all
deliberate speed."8 4 District judges in the south required very little
actual desegregation until the late 1960s, when federal legislative
action and the futility of local compliance led the Supreme Court to
require more intrusive remedies. In the desegregation cases, judges
at all levels were playing a less aggressive strategic game than
Representative Little and the Baker court: the judges were settling
for option C (doing nothing) until they felt political conditions were
receptive-and then judges often settled for option B (partial
integration), rather than option A (full racial integration).
Even the Supreme Court's rejection of different-race marriage
bars in Loving reflects the power of strategic calculations to delay
the implementation of unquestionably correct liberal rights. The
openly racist Virginia statute first came to the Court in 1955, right
after Brown. The Court remanded the case to the state court to
reconsider its holding.8 5 The Virginia Supreme Court reaffirmed
the validity of the statute, which was supported by traditionalist
fears of a "mongrel race" and other consequences of different-race
marriage; this had been a decidedly illiberal justification, but the
United States Supreme Court in 1956 dismissed the appeal from
that ruling.86 Some liberals were appalled by the Court's action,
because it was not only unprincipled, but was a retreat from the
greatest principle the Court had ever announced: anti-apartheid.
Defenders of the Court maintained that dodging the different-race
marriage issue in 1956 was necessary to protect the result in
Brown.87 Southern racists were mad enough about the threat of
school desegregation; they were virtually hysterical at the prospect
of different-race marriage, and their prejudice was shared by many
northerners and people of color. To preserve option B (Brown 1/,
the Court was willing to postpone enforcement of option A for more
than a decade (Loving), at which point half the states with
miscegenation statutes had repealed them.
81 See Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 349 U.S. 294, 301 (1955).
85 Naim v. Naim, 350 U.S. 891 (1955), remanded to 90 S.E.2d 849 (Va. 1956).
86 Naim v. Naim, 90 S.E.2d. 849 (Va.), appealdenied, 350 U.S. 985 (1956).
87 See William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, An Historical and Critical Introduction
to The Legal Process, in THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND
APPLICATION OF LAW cx (William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey eds., 1994).
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There is a broader lesson for the modern state: its constitution
may promise liberal rights that its political system cannot
immediately deliver and that its judiciary dare not insist upon.
Different-race marriage was such a right in the 1950s and 1960s,
and same-sex marriage is such a right today. That the political and
judicial system cannot practically implement such rights
immediately does not mean that they are entirely empty. Justice
delayed is not always justice denied. Sometimes rights come on
little cat's feet.
B. Equality Practice.- A Pragmatic Implementation of Liberal
Equality
Gaylegal experience in both the United States and other countries
provides some support for the foregoing analysis, at least as a
descriptive matter. As Professor Kees Waaldjik has argued,
comparative law information provides insight into the movement
toward same-sex marriage in general and in his country, The
Netherlands, whose Parliament just passed a same-sex marriage
law.88 One lesson Professor Waaldjik and I would draw from the
experience of same-sex marriage, or union recognition, in other
countries is that legal recognition of same-sex marriage comes
through a step-by-step process. Such a process is sequential and
incremental: it proceeds by little steps taken in a particular order.
Registered partnership or civil union-type laws have not been
adopted until a particular country has first decriminalized
consensual sodomy and equalized the age of consent for homosexual
and heterosexual intercourse, then has adopted laws prohibiting
employment and other kinds of discrimination against gay people,
and, finally, has provided other kinds of more limited state
recognition for same-sex relationships, such as giving legal benefits
to or enforcing legal obligations on cohabiting same-sex couples.
8 9
That The Netherlands is on the brink of recognizing same-sex
marriages was facilitated by its prior recognition of, and successful
experience with, registered partnerships.
88 See KEES WAALDIJK, SMALL CHANGE: HOW THE ROAD TO SAME-SEX MARRIAGE GOT
PAVED IN THE NETHERLANDS, in LEGAL RECOGNITION OF SAME-SEX PARTNERSHIPS: A STUDY
OF NATIONAL, EUROPEAN AND INTERNATIONAL LAW (Robert Wintemute & Mads Andenaes
eds., forthcoming from Oxford Univ. Press 2001).
89 See Eskridge, supra note 76 (tabulating gay-equality measures in various countries and
various states of this country and showing that there is a sequential progression toward state
recognition of same-sex unions).
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The recurrence of the pattern suggests this paradox: law cannot
liberalize unless public opinion moves, but public attitudes can be
influenced by changes in the law. For gay rights, the impasse
suggested by this paradox can be ameliorated or broken if the
proponents of reform move step by step along a continuum of little
reforms. There are pragmatic reasons why such a step-by-step
process can break the impasse: it permits gradual adjustment of
antigay mindsets, slowly empowers gay rights advocates, and can
discredit antigay arguments. The step-by-step approach to
achieving the liberal goal of full equality that is suggested by the
American pragmatist tradition in philosophy and by our experience
with the race cases (Loving) also finds support in gay experience.
Coming out of the closet to one's friends and family has in the last
two generations been the defining moment, or cluster of moments,
for many lesbians and gay men. Coming out is an expression of
identity and an association of the individual with the gay
community, but it is also an invitation to equal treatment: you have
been my parent/friend/coworker, and I want you to continue to be
my parent/friend/coworker now that you know more about me. This
is an invitation sometimes declined and sometimes accepted
unconditionally. Most often, however, the invitation is accepted
with conditions, such as a tacit insistence that the lesbian or gay
person be discreet in her discussions of sexuality.90 The conditions
themselves may change over time, as the parent/friend/coworker
becomes accustomed to the lesbian or gay person's identity, and as
she or he talks about the issues that coming out raises. Is it
unprincipled for the open lesbian or gay person to trim her openness
in order to accommodate the needs of other persons? In my view,
no. Even for most of us who would prefer completely equal
treatment as an aspiration ought to settle for conditional equality
out of humane respect for other people's feelings. Especially when
loved ones are willing to accommodate our identities as gay people,
we ought to accommodate their identities as gay-ambivalent people.
For many, this accommodation becomes a permanent compromise of
equal treatment. But it need not be.
50 See Rodney Christopher, Explaining It to Dad, in BOYs LIKE Us: GAY WRITERS TELL
THEIR COMING OUT STORIES 302-11 (Patrick Merla ed., 1996) [hereinafter BOYS LIKE US].
For other examples of accommodation, see William Sterling Walker, January 18, 1989, in id.
at 293-301, relating a mother's acceptance of her son's homosexuality, and also her insistence
that he not share food with his nieces and nephews; Ron Caldwell, Out-Takes, in id. at 270,
relating the author's agreement not to tell his brother about his homosexual identification
until the latter graduates from high school.
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Philip Bockman's short story, I ishing Practice, recounts the shock
his disclosure yielded for his parents. His father, who was the first
to know, implored the author to soften the blow of disclosure to his
ill mother by agreeing to see a psychiatrist. Bockman agreed to do
this (the psychiatrist turned out to be a "friend of Dorothy"). That
he was seeking professional help made it easier for his parents to
deal with this new knowledge, and each parent privately expressed
continued love, but not yet comfortableness in talking about the
subject.
Once, I expressed my frustration to my father about "the
silent treatment." "We're trying," he explained. "Please give
us time." He smiled, and I was reminded of an incident from
my childhood, at about the age of six. He had taken me
fishing. He hauled in one fish after the other, while I caught
none. At the end of the day, I burst out crying. Kneeling
beside me, he told me gently, "Don't be too sad. Remember,
it takes a long time to get good at something. Be patient.
Don't think of today as fishing, just think of it as fishing
practice."91
After several years, Bockman brought his lover home to meet his
parents, who welcomed the friend but still did not feel comfortable
talking about homosexuality. 92 Still later, after his mother's death,
the author found his father positively affirming and finally willing
to talk.93 Bockman's coming out of the closet with his family
occurred over a period of discursive time, not in an instant road-to-
Damascus revelation.
The same fishing-practice dynamics are needed for a political
culture, even an aspirationally liberal one, to come to terms with
new identity knowledge. The dynamics of gradual racial
integration, step-by-step advancement of gay rights, and the process
leading up to Vermont's civil unions law is what I call equality
practice. Like liberal rights themselves, this is an aspiration that
may or may not be realized: equality practice that moves too
swiftly, as same-sex marriage apparently did in Hawaii and Alaska,
may yield a counterproductive backlash, but one that moves too
slowly risks entrenching a grating inequality. In my liberal view,
Vermont got it right, but the views that really count are those of
Vermonters themselves. And those views are still being formed.
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C Pragmatic Liberalism and the Conditions for Equality
Equality practice poses a normative problem for liberal theory.
What stance should the liberal take toward the failure of the
political system to remedy a denial of rights? One approach is the
liberal pragmatism of Judge Richard Posner.94 He takes private
attitudes and prejudices as a limit on the ability of law to
implement liberal rights and urges the liberal to wait until those
attitudes change. This stance ought not be attractive to most
liberals, because it is too ready to sacrifice rights and because
remediation is too conflict-laden. Also, Posner's particular theory is
too passive as to private illiberal attitudes: not only does the state
often bear some responsibility for such attitudes, but the state can
affect those attitudes and, more important, can influence the kinds
of arguments that are acceptable in public debate. The liberal idea
of public reason insists that the state deem certain kinds of
arguments out of bounds, and gaylegal experience suggests that this
is not an impractical aspiration. Given the experience in Vermont
and the comparative law survey in Part III, there can be little doubt
that state insistence on public reason as a condition of debate has
an effect on the conduct of the debate. Notwithstanding the
perseverance of private homophobia or anxiety, countries adopting
equality measures have seen a shift in public discourse about
lesbian and gay relationships and have been increasingly willing to
recognize them legally.
The opposite stance would be disavowal: equality practice may be
inevitable and even admirable in some ways, but is not defensible
under liberal premises. Recall Chief Justice Amestoy's opinion in
Baker, which defied exclusionary tradition when it articulated a
constitutional right for same-sex couples, but then invoked that
tradition in fashioning a remedy. 95 One could plausibly reject this
deployment of tradition as incoherent with liberal principles, and
comfortably conclude that the court's equality practice is a great
advance in the direction of liberal equality but must be faulted for
not going all the way. Initially, I must object that this is an
94 See Richard Posner, Should There Be Homosexual Marriage? And I/ So, Who Should
Decide?, 95 MICH. L. REV. 1578, 1585-86 (1997) (reviewing WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., THE
CASE FOR SAME-SEX MARRIAGE (1996)).
91 Compare Baker v. State, 744 A.2d 864, 885-86 (Vt. 1999) (rejecting exclusionary
tradition as a reason to deny the right), with POSNER, supra 94, at 887 (finding traditional
attitudes not altogether irrelevant in fashioning a remedy), and DEBATING DEMOCRACY'S
DISCONTENT: ESSAYS ON AMERICAN POLITICS, LAW, AND PUBLIC PHILOSOPHY 117-25 (Anita L.
Allen & Milton C. Regan, Jr. eds., 1998).
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idealized liberalism. Any liberal who insists that recognition of
rights-such as the right to marry-proceed through the legal
process has already accepted a delay between the existence of a
liberal right and its implementation. The point of equality practice
is that the more disconnected a right is from our specific legal
traditions, as same-sex marriage is, the more time the legal process
needs to effectuate it. In The Netherlands, it only took three years
to move from registered partnership to same-sex marriage-faster
than many court cases are heard in this country. In Vermont, the
shift would certainly take much longer, and it might never come.
Can a strict liberal accept a compromise that might never advance
to full equality?
Probably not, but there is a liberal reason to consider a long gap
between rights recognition and implementation, under certain
circumstances. The fishing practice analogy in Bockman's story
worked because all the participants were respectful of the other's
perspectives and of the fact that the parents needed learning time
to assimilate that perspective. Like the family dynamics in the
story, public reason in state deliberations depends on reciprocity:
all citizens and officials invoke public-regarding justifications with
the understanding that each is giving up her own parochial
justifications and is trying to learn from the other participants. The
Vermont House Judiciary Committee deliberations met these
conditions for public reason, for it was a heterogeneous group whose
members studied the matter exhaustively and argued respectfully
and reasonably.96 Its conclusion was that the primary needs of
lesbian and gay couples, including dignity and public respect, could
be met by a new institution with the name civil union. There is no
doubt that the committee not only considered but internalized the
lesbian and gay perspective-including the fact that many lesbians
and gay men do not want to be associated with the institution of
"4marriage" and its patriarchal baggage. Two of its three strongest
supporters of same-sex marriage, Representatives Lippert and
Hingtgen, voted for the civil unions bill when it was reported to the
House and made passionate speeches for it on the House floor.
Their motivations included not just respect for their colleagues and
a judgment that civil unions were the closest they could come to
marriage under the circumstances, but also the notion that the
political process has a learning curve, to which civil unions in
practice could contribute to.
96 This is in contrast to the cursory and disrespectful deliberation surrounding DOMA.
[Vol. 64
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A liberal could reject the foregoing argument on the ground that
the committee members compromised their commitment to public
reason when they acquiesced in the illiberal attitudes of the rest of
the legislature (recall the strategic analysis above). One could
concede that equality practice advances the liberal project but is
also an unprincipled sacrifice of public reason. If I am right about
this, equality practice not only exposes a big gap between liberal
aspiration and the likely operation of a political system, but also
suggests a big problem with liberal theory, for it would then ignore
the dynamics of public education. There is no sound justification for
viewing public reason statically. A lesson of lesbian, gay, and
bisexual experience is that coming out of the closet changes the
circumstances of discourse and opens up the possibility of candid
and equal conversation-but typically after a process of observation
and learning.
There is a third way of evaluating equality practice, a pragmatic
liberalism.9 7 The goal of such a theory would be full equality for
citizens in the strictest liberal sense, but with recognition that
equality cannot be imposed upon and must be worked for within a
political system of heterogeneous preferences. As Part I
demonstrates, the same-sex marriage movement teaches us that
process matters and that equality cannot be shoved down unwilling
throats, especially by the judiciary. So liberalism in operation
cannot ignore pragmatic features such as those entailed in equality
practice. If a goal of liberalism is the inculcation of the values of
tolerance and mutual respect, the way in which liberal projects are
accomplished must be consistent with these values. For the
judiciary, or the professorate, to tell traditionalist citizens that their
time-tested family values count for nothing in the same-sex
marriage debate is a time-tested path to political alienation or
revolt. The genius of Vermont's equality practice is that the state
insisted that traditional family values give way to the recognition of
lesbian and gay rights, but lesbian and gay family values give way
to accommodation of traditionalist anxieties for the time being.
Once civil unions in action reveal to Vermonters that lesbian and
gay relationships are serious and loving (and fraught with most of
the same problems as marital unions), the state might be ripe for
graduation from equality practice to equality, simpliciter.
97 Pragmatic liberalism has substantial affinity with the minimalist liberalism articulated
by Richard Rorty, A Defense of Minimalist Liberalism, in DEMOCRACY'S DISCONTENT:
AMERICA IN SEARCH OF A PUBLIC PHILOSOPHY (Michael J. Sandel ed., 1996).
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